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 Is the Sheil a Shill? Informal
 Credit in Rural Sudan
 MICHAEL KEVANE
 Then I saw them dividing up the sacks between them. Hussein the merchant took ten;
 each of the strangers took five. Mousa the owner of the field next to ours on the eastern
 side took five, and my grandfather took five. Understanding nothing, I looked at Masood
 and saw that his eyes were darting about to left and right like two mice that have lost their
 way home. "You're still fifty pounds in debt to me," said my grandfather to Masood,
 "We'll talk about it later."
 -Tayeb Salih, "A Handful of Dates," in The Wedding of Zein and Other Stories
 My dictionary defines a shill as a person "who poses as an innocent bystander to help
 a confidence man win over a prospective victim."' The Sudanese system of informal
 credit, known as sheil2 credit, has been described by many academic writers as an
 exploitative, usurious form of lending, much as Tayeb Salih implies about the loan
 transaction between Masood and the grandfather. These writers argue that an important
 cause ofthe persistence and deepening ofpoverty is the monopolistic position ofvillage
 lenders. But is that really what the sheil is? Or has the sheil been misrepresented in order
 to be consistent with a broader perspective about the nature of Sudanese rural society?
 That is, might not the sheil be a shill for these writers, in the sense that it is posed, wrongly,
 as a metaphor for the personalistic exploitation they see as pervading rural society.
 Realizing this, we might hesitate to agree with the broad-brush characterizations that
 have justified misguided and counterproductive policies.
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 The purpose of this paper is not to be polemical, but to explore this possibility, in the
 hopes of influencing both the manner in which informal credit issues are researched and
 the way policymakers conceive of interventions in informal credit markets. Section 1
 discusses the conventional wisdom on rural credit in Sudan. Section 2 summarizes some
 theoretical and methodological problems with this conventional wisdom. Section 3
 presents some "revisionist" evidence from both eastern and western Sudan. This
 evidence, and the earlier discussion on the conventional wisdom, suggests some new
 approaches to research on the topic, and these are explored in the fourth section. Section
 5 presents concluding comments.
 The Basis of the Conventional Wisdom
 The subject of informal credit for peasant farmers in Sudan has achieved a certain
 notoriety owing to the assumption that lending is problematic in a predominantly Islamic
 country.3 It is widely held that merchants and would-be money lenders, in deference to
 religious prohibitions against usury, developed a system of lending whereby standing
 crops would be purchased early in the season. This supposedly highly exploitative
 system is known as the sheil system. During the growing season, when the farmer is in
 greatest need of cash and food, the merchant or lender enters into an agreement with the
 farmer to buy a certain amount of the farmer's standing crop at a set price per sack. This
 price will generally, though not with complete certainty, be lower than the price in the
 market after the harvest. The lender pays the farmer at the time ofthe agreement and after
 the harvest collects the sacks and stores them until prices are most favorable.
 The conventional wisdom regarding the prevalence and nature of this system of
 informal credit in Sudan is expressed in the following statements from A. B. Zahlan's
 collection of papers on Sudanese agriculture:4
 The majority of smallholders resort to traditional borrowing under the sheil system. The implied interest
 rate differs according to location and time of borrowing but can be as high as 300 per cent for loans made
 at the peak of the season (mid-August/early September).5
 In the Gezira Scheme ... the rate of interest on informal loans ranged from 115 per cent to 280 per cent
 despite the fact that a branch ofthe ABS [Agricultural Bank of Sudan] was present in the area and would offer
 low interest loans and the built-in credit system of the Gezira board is available for cotton and wheat crops.6
 Statements that moneylenders always charge high interest rates to offset the high risks they take lack
 empirical data in support and many surveys in rural areas have contradicted this widely perpetuated myth.7
 Surveys carried out by the ABS in this region [Kordofan] showed that 50 per cent of the cultivators
 received sheil credit and realised only 50 per cent ofthe market price.... The system is as strongly entrenched
 in this region as it is in other parts of Sudan.8
 The local trade is controlled by village merchants and agents of big merchants and exporters. The sheil
 credit system is one of the main reasons for village merchants getting large shares of the tenants' groundnut
 sales.9
 These selections are representative of the literature; almost every article or book on the
 rural economy in Sudan focuses on the exploitative nature and pervasiveness ofthe sheil
 system when discussing informal credit.
 Only a handful of empirical studies, however, carefully investigate the extent and
 volume ofthis practice. As far as the rainfed sector is concerned, only the extremely brief
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 study by Handouk, Beshir, and Abudiek is explicitly concerned with credit.'0 The
 authors interviewed 100 farmers in November 1984. They found that 34 percent
 obtained credit for agricultural purposes from the sheil system. Of these, 88 percent
 borrowed from village merchants while 12 percent borrowed from persons outside the
 village. No information is given regarding the sizes of loans, repayments, or other
 aspects of the system. A more general study by Awad found in a survey of 391
 households in the Southern Kordofan region that only 11.8 percent of all households
 obtained informal loans for agriculture, two-thirds of these in cash and the other third
 in kind. Again, however, no information is given as to the amounts involved or the
 methods of lending."
 The more exhaustive works dealing with sheil analyze the system in the irrigated
 schemes of eastern Sudan.'2 Adam and Apaya, in a study of 96 Gezira scheme tenants,
 reported that well over 80 percent of those having between 5-20feddan (a feddan is
 1.038 acres) obtained loans for dura (sorghum), around 45 percent for wheat, and over
 35 percent for groundnuts.'3 For dura and groundnuts, these farmers usually obtained
 loans equal in value to halformore oftheir crop. While not calculating interest rates, they
 demonstrated the exploitative nature of the system by calculating the ratio of the price
 received per sack by the borrower in a transaction and the price that prevailed in the
 market after the harvest. In most cases the price was less than half the market price,
 especially for the smaller tenants, who were generally the lower-income group. The
 difference between the prices represents, of course, a clear and immediate profit to the
 merchant. This is the major characteristic ofthe system that emerges from the literature;
 the merchant always derives aprofit immediately upon repayment ofthe loanbyselling,
 at the market price, the sacks received from the borrower. Adam and Apaya explained
 how this system of direct and individual exploitation continued:
 Little institutional credit is available to [the farmer] for production and marketing purposes and he is not
 able to obtain consumer credit from institutional sources at all. Consequently, the tenant turns to village
 merchants and other operators of traditional credit.... The terms on which he obtains credit from the
 traditional system are not fair to him, but he continues to borrow from this source because alternative sources
 are not available.14
 El Medani, using data from 90 Gezira farmers interviewed throughout 1973-74,
 found that almost two-thirds of all tenants borrowed money through the sheil system.'5
 By analyzing the farmers' cash flows, El Medani determined the difference between
 farmers' available funds and cash requirements during the growing season. This deficit
 was mostly met by advances from the Sudan Gezira Board. El Medani noted:
 Although the contribution of 'shail' is meagre in reducing the deficit, a good proportion of the farm
 surplus is absorbed in repayment.... Nearly 70% (dura), 67% (wheat) and 34% (groundnuts) of the
 remaining marketable surplus of the poor dealing in 'shail' is absorbed in repayment to these merchants.'6
 According to El Medani, "the interest rate in the average period of the loan reached
 80% or approximately 20% per month," and so the annual rates of interest ranged
 between "300% and 7000% with a weighted average of 726%."'7 He did not present the
 most important data needed for calculating the interest rate, namely, the amount paid to
 the lender and the market price of dura at the time of repayment, so it is difficult to
 interpret the interest rates reported.
 More recently, Saleem has used data from a 1981 survey of six villages in the Gezira
 and Rahad schemes to argue that the implicit interest rates of sheil loans are far higher
 than those impliedby the "lender's risk" model.'8 Saleem found that when compounded
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 monthly, interest rates averaged between 172-201 percent on a per annum basis,
 depending on the crop. Using the default rate reported by lenders, Saleem observed that
 only around 12 percent of these interest payments could be accounted for as compen-
 sation for default risk. The rest, he argued, was due to monopoly rents.
 The finding of these studies that small farmers in Sudan lose a considerable part of
 their surplus because they have no option but to engage in exploitative lending
 arrangements has been used to promote the expansion of government credit programs.
 In the words of El Shibly:
 These extremely high rates of profit to money-lenders signify the very poor connection between the
 organized and the unorganized money markets in the Sudan. As a result, the resort to orthodox and
 conventional monetary policy measures to bring down these rates does not seem likely to be fruitful....
 However, this is not to say that the gradual abolition of the system is not attainable. Indeed, the volume of
 official cheap loans can be increased through a wider dispersion of the Agricultural Bank and commercial
 banks' branches.'9
 Theoretical and Methodological Problems with Sheil Lending Research
 There are a number of problems with the way sheil has been presented that suggest
 a need for a more critical look. The studies reviewed earlier follow the conventional
 "lender's risk" approach ofbreaking down the nominal interest rate into the various cost
 components, with the residual being a measure ofmonopoly power. They use household
 surveys to collect information on interest rates. Moneylenders and local commercial
 banks are canvassed in order to determine the costs of lending. Included in the costs is
 the rate of default. If the interest rate is found to be high relative to the costs of lending,
 the market must be monopolistic and a rural credit program is needed. If the interest rate
 is low, then the market is competitive and better left alone.
 There are, I believe, six problems with this methodological approach and the theory
 that underlies it.
 First, since the lender rarely relies solely on lending as a source of income, it is
 difficult to disentangle the costs of lending from costs incurred in other activities.
 Second, it is not clear what the appropriate measure of opportunity cost should be,
 especially in Sudan where activities are highly seasonal. Profits from rainy season
 farming may be very different from dry season crop speculation.
 Third, care must be taken in interpreting repayments as interest charges, since sheil
 loans do not explicitly include interest charges. Sheil loans are similar to a forward
 contract, or a crop mortgage. The borrower takes an amount of cash (A) and agrees to
 repay a number of sacks (B) of produce, usually after harvest. The amount AIB is the
 forward price at which the lender is purchasing produce. The return to the lender then
 depends on the market price of the product (p) at the time the loan is repaid (assuming
 the product is easily marketed). In this case the absolute profit is
 pB-A,
 and the return on capital (the implicit interest rate) over the period of the loan is
 pB -A
 A
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 It is not appropriate to take this simple interest rate and turn it into an annual compound
 rate (where interest is added to the principal) unless there is evidence that rates are, in
 fact, compounded. Not compounding can make dramatic differences in reported interest
 charges. For example, suppose the return on a sheil loan were calculated to be 60 percent
 for a loan of three months. At a simple interest rate, this translates into 20 percent per
 month, or 240 percent per year. If we assumed that the relevant interest rate was a
 compound rate, that is 17 percent per month, which after three months yields 60 percent,
 then the annual rate would be 558 percent. This is ridiculous of course, since in fact the
 rates are not compounded.20
 Fourth, the change in the price of the product from the time of repayment (usually
 after harvest) until the postharvest peak price is irrelevant for calculating the return to
 the lender from the loan. The lender could always have refused to make the loan and used
 the money to purchase the crop after harvest and store it, thereby earning that return.
 Similarly, the borrower could have refused to borrow, and then not have had to repay
 the loan, and instead stored the crop until prices rose. So the postrepayment change in
 crop price should not enter the calculation of the lender's return.
 Fifth, it should be remembered that the preceding discussion deals with "after the
 fact" returns on capital. The sheil contract has a risk-sharing component that is not
 present in the ordinary interest rate contract. At the time of making the contract, those
 involved do not know what the prices will be at harvest. Ifthe market price turns out high,
 the merchant will make a large profit. If the price turns out low, however, the lender may
 end up taking a loss. It is difficult to know how to measure the costs of this price risk.
 One could attempt to measure the risk premium using a standard formula from utility
 theory where the risk premium is equal to one-half the estimated coefficient of relative
 risk aversion times the variance of income from loans. Another approach that some
 researchers use is to look at historical rates of default, but this does not tell the researcher
 how the lender values these uncertain losses.
 Sixth, other indicators of the conditions under which loans are made-that is, their
 structure (the number of actual and potential lenders and borrowers) and conduct (the
 form of contracts, enforcement, and collateral)-are rarely examined to confirm or
 negate the assessment that a monopolistic market structure exists.
 Some "Revisionist" Evidence
 In addition to the methodological problems of the work that forms the basis for
 conventional wisdom about sheil, not all studies corroborate the view that informal
 credit in Sudan is exploitative. A 1986 survey of El Obeid district found very little
 informal credit, and of the loans that were reported, "no interest was charged on 89% of
 the credit extended by informal sources.""2 Tully, in the context of an investigation into
 the changing relations of exchange in Darfur, noted:
 It [sheil] is not exceptional as a source ofprofit from the merchants point of view.... Those who extended
 [groundlnuts on a two for one basis made less money than it seems, since nuts were worth LS 5.00 or more
 at planting [versus 3.5-4.0 at harvest].22
 Four studies undertaken by me-a survey in the Butana area along the Blue Nile in 1985
 and three studies in the Sheikan area of Kordofan completed in 1990-also suggest that
 the sheil may not be as monolithic an institution as the conventional wisdom suggests.
 Let me review each in turn.
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 Eastern Gezira. During the 1985 agricultural season that followed the drought and
 famine of 1984, 1 conducted a survey of informal credit in an area of rainfed agriculture
 east of the Blue Nile across from the Gezira scheme and bordering the Rahad scheme
 and the Butana pasturelands. The survey was designed to measure the extent, volume,
 types, and sources of borrowing.23 Four types of loans were distinguished: (1) loans of
 dura (sorghum), where repayment was the cash value of the dura at the time of
 borrowing, simply a buying on credit with no interest charge (these will be called dura-
 LS loans, where LS stands for Sudanese pounds); (2) sheil loans, where the loan was
 reckoned at the dura price prevailing after harvest, and where most respondents
 indicated that no explicit price per sack was agreed on beforehand (LS-dura loans); (3)
 no-interest cash loans with cash repayments (LS-LS loans); and (4) no-interest loans in
 kind (dura-dura loans).
 Tables 1 and 2 present the magnitude and number of these loans. The data has been
 classified into two regions: the first is the area closer to the Blue Nile, where plots
 cultivated are smaller, animal husbandry is less important, and work is available on small
 irrigated farms along the river; and the second is the area along the Butana, where most
 farmers have larger rainfed plots and often migrate to the irrigated schemes during the
 off-season.
 Given that the 1984 crop had failed almost completely in northern areas of Sudan, it
 was not surprising to find that over 80 percent of all the families surveyed borrowed in
 TABLE 1
 EXTENT OF BORROWING AMONG SURVEY RESPONDENTS
 (In Percentages)
 Taking Taking More Taking More Taking More
 Loans of than One than LS 200 than LS 400
 Region Any Kind Loan in Value in Value
 1 (N= 309) 82 28 35 11
 2 (N =400) 80 35 50 30
 Total (N= 709) 81 32 44 22
 NoTEs: N = number of respondents; LS = Sudanese pounds.
 TABLE 2
 VOLUME OF CASH AND DURA LOANS, TOTALS AND AVERAGES
 CASH DURA
 Average Average
 Total Average per Total Average per
 REGION Loans Loan Borrower Loans Loan Borrower
 LS-LSa Dura-LSb
 1 34,079 122 154 13.4 1.3 1.3
 2 61,257 200 226 171.8 2.8 2.8
 Total 95,336 163 193 185.2 2.7 2.7
 LS-Duraa Dura-Durab
 1 3,805 152 165 67.0 3.0 3.0
 2 30,786 196 238 123.7 2.6 2.7
 Total 34,591 190 228 190.7 2.7 2.8
 aIn Sudanese pounds.
 bIn 100 kg sacks.
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 some form or another, and 44 percent borrowed more than LS 200 in value, where loans
 in kind were valued at the then current market price of LS 150 per hundred kilo sack of
 dura. (At the time of the survey, the official exchange rate was LS 4 = US $1, so a loan
 of LS 200 amounted to approximately $50.) Table 2 shows that the average loan size and
 total amounts borrowed were higher in the less developed Butana region, where,
 presumably, there was a higher demand for credit, as opposed to a higher supply.
 Figure 1 gives the percentage distribution, by number of loans and by total value of
 the loans, of the four different types of loans. The figure clearly shows that the LS-Dura
 loans, those sheil-like agreements, constituted a very small proportion of the number of
 loans (20 percent) and of the value of loans (19 percent). The notable feature of figure
 1 is that most loans, i.e., the LS-LS loans, appear to have been extended with no
 expectation of direct monetary gain for the lender. Indeed, some loans, like the dura-dura
 loans, would lead to losses if the dura were valued at postharvest prices.
 Those loans that did have an implicit interest component may be broken down
 according to the source of the loan. The survey respondents were asked whether the loan
 came from a merchant, a rich person living in the area, or another farmer. This very crude
 80 -
 Number of loans (Total = 908)










 LS - LS S - Dura Dura -LS Dura -Dura
 Type of Loan
 Fig. 1. Distribution of Types of Loans in Eastern Gezira Area by Number and Value.
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 breakdown was intended to enable the borrowers to identify the defining characteristic
 of the lender; if the farmer sees the lender as a fellow farmer, rather than as a merchant,
 then the implicit interest rate would presumably reflect that social relationship. Overall
 49 percent ofall loans came from merchants, and table 3 shows thatproportionately more
 of the loans of higher value came from them. Figures 2 and 3 show that there were wide
 variations in the implicitpostharvest interest charges for the dura-LS and LS-dura loans.
 TABLE 3
 DISTRIBUTION OF SOURCES OF LOANS BY VALUE OF LOANS
 (In Percentages)
 VALUE (LS)
 1-199 200-399 400+
 SOURCE (N=565) (N = 221) (N= 120)
 Merchant 47 53 55
 Rich person 29 30 22
 Other farmer 24 16 23
 Total 100 99 100
 NOTE: N= number of loans.
 Figure 2 gives the breakdown of prices used to value repayment of dura-LS loans by
 showing the percentage ofloans from each type oflender according to the effective price
 receivedpersack. The averageprice receivedpersack, upon cashrepaymentofthe 185.2
 sacks of dura advanced on credit during the rainy season, was only LS 94.2, well below
 the price of around LS 150 that prevailed when the loans were taken. Most of the lower
 prices were charged by farmers (54 percent); merchants generally obtained higherprices
 for the dura advanced. The apparently large number of merchants who advanced grain
 and were repaid less than the value ofthe grain at the time ofthe loan might be explained
 by the fact that the market price dropped to LS 35 after the harvest, at the time of
 repayment. The farmers who borrowedmay have been in strong "negotiating" positions
 when it came time to settle accounts, and merchants accepted prices that were higher than
 the prevailing postharvest price.
 A similar picture emerges from an analysis of the repayment of LS-dura loans, as
 shown in figure 3. For the LS 34,691 borrowed in this form, the lenders received (or
 could expect to receive, according to the borrowers) 902.25 sacks of dura. Thus, the
 lenders paid an average of LS 38.4 per sack when "buying" grain in advance of the
 harvest. This price was just a little above the postharvest market price of LS 35. Figure
 3 shows that more than half (99 out of 182) of all LS-dura loans were reckoned at about
 the market price (LS 35-40) while the rest were almost equally divided between higher
 and lower prices. Loans from merchants were more often characterized by lower prices
 (more sacks repaid), while "rich persons" were more often sources of loans repaid with
 higher effective prices (fewer sacks repaid).
 Bireka Village. From October 1989 to December 1990 1 lived in the small village of
 Bireka, about 40 kilometers south of El Obeid, the regional capital of Kordofan. There
 were four kinds of credit in Bireka. Petty traders borrowed merchandise on credit from
 their suppliers in El Obeid. There were no fonnal terms ofrepayment, though borrowers
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 Fig. 2. Percentage of Dura-LS Loans from Each Type of Lender according to the Effective Price Received per Sack.
 indicated that the relationship with the supplier would suffer if repayment were not
 prompt. Virtually all borrowers stated that they would repay without interest. Trade
 credit was not without risk; the borrower could find that market prices had suddenly
 fluctuated, and he might not be able to sell the stock for the purchase price. Or the goods
 might not be easily sold because of low demand, and the borrower might have to use the
 borrowed capital for consumption. The lender must then try to enforce repayment. Late
 in 1990, for instance, a used-clothing merchant from El Obeid spent two days traveling
 to the regional markets in search of several individuals who had borrowed clothing on
 credit, with a value of LS 1,000-2,000.
 Returned migrants were a second source of loans. The head of the wealthiest
 household in Bireka, with two sons returned from Saudi Arabia, had given a loan of LS
 1,000 to the village butcher. He claimed not to want interest; hejust wanted to be "assured
 ofa steady supply ofmeat." The butcher gave the household a kilo ofmeat every Monday
 and Friday, the equivalent of LS 200 per month. The butcher in turn provided no-interest
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 Fig. 3. Percentage of LS-Dura Loans from Each Type of Lender according to the Effective Pnice Paid per Sack.
 "store credit," along with his nephew, who owned a small shop at the truck stop along
 the road to El Obeid, to the women who operated the tea stands along the road. The
 women borrowed meat, sugar, tea, coffee, and oil in the mornings, and repaid in the
 evening or the next day. Many of these noninterest short-term loans, though, were
 outstanding for weeks.
 Family members were another source of no-interest loans. Three Hausa men, for
 instance, borrowed money from relatives from other villages. Two of these loans were
 used to meet the costs of weddings. Relatives were also important sources of credit after
 it became clear that the 1990 rainy season would fail and there would be no harvest.24
 One man wrote to his brother who had migrated to Khartoum over 20 years before to
 work as a police officer. Within two months the brother had sent LS 1,000 and a promise
 of more help. The ability or willingness to borrow from wealthier relatives should not
 be overestimated, however. One poor Hausa farmer stated that he had five relatives on
 his father's side, all of whom were prosperous merchants. "Shaba 'aniin," he said about
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 them, "full and satisfied." They lived in a village only an hour walk away, yet he had not
 received any help from them, nor would he consider asking them for help. As his trading
 capital invested in a small stock of secondhand clothing dwindled, he earned lower
 profits and he and his family reduced their consumption.
 The only lender of explicit interest-earning credit was the lender of six sheil loans to
 Bireka villagers in the 1989 rainy season. He was from a neighboring village. He did not
 hesitate to show me his notebook with the names ofthe borrowers along with the number
 of groundnut sacks they had agreed to repay. The lender had advanced them LS 60 per
 sack, and most had borrowed only one or two sacks worth of cash. At the time, LS 120
 was roughly enough to purchase one month's grain for an average family. Six of the
 borrowers were poor villagers who worked as daily laborers. The seventh sometimes
 hired labor, and in a separate interview denied ever having borrowed. All of the
 borrowers were heavy drinkers of merissa, the brewed sorghum beer, as was the trader.
 They spent considerable time in each other's company during the long all-morning
 drinking sessions that would be held every few days.
 The trader stated that he had agreed to lend the money because all of the borrowers
 had received groundnut seed from the Extension Department of the Regional Ministry
 of Agriculture and had planted relatively large areas to groundnuts. It was the first time
 he had ever lent money. The six Bireka borrowers repaid, but a seventh borrower, from
 the trader's own village, had not. The trader said he had no intention of pursuing the
 matter: "If I try, he will raise a fuss, and cause a lot of trouble, and complain about me."
 The lender did not lend again in the 1990 season, though this may have beenbecause the
 rains were poor.
 Considering these various sources of loans, table 4 shows that only 17 out of 54
 Bireka households borrowed during the 1989 and 1990 seasons; 10 of these loans were
 without interest, 2 trade loans were interest bearing, and the 6 sheil loans were at variable
 rates-the price of a sack of groundnuts turned out to be LS 1 10, which for a three month
 loan would be roughly 30 percent per month in interest.
 TABLE 4
 NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS BORROWING iN BIREKA VILLAGE BY SOURCE
 No Trade Returned
 Borrowing Sheil Credit Migrant Family
 Hausa 20 0 3 2 3
 Burgo 7 5 0 0 0
 Arab 12 1 2 0 1
 Total 39 6 5 2 4
 There was also official agricultural credit available in Bireka, but it was not used in
 1989 nor was it used in 1990. The Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS) had organized a
 cooperative to distribute credit for the production of sesame. In the 1987 season loans
 were disbursed, but because the season was poor, the bank decided not to enforce
 repayment andto roll the loans over. The farmers againborrowed in 1988, and the season
 was average. The ABS decided to strictly enforce repayment of loans from both seasons,
 including threatening to take borrowers to court to force them to sell assets. Over the
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 course of the year all of the borrowers from Bireka repaid, some very late. The result,
 however, was that the cooperative could not get enough members to agree to borrow a
 third year for the 1989 season. Only 16 out of50 wanted to borrow again; the rest thought
 it too risky. They did not want to lose their assets if the season failed. The ABS refused
 to lend to the 16, saying it was too small a number to justify the costs of disbursing and
 collecting the loans.25
 Four Villages near Jaibat. As noted earlier, the 1990 season tumed into a complete
 crop failure over most of Kordofan. It was obvious very early in the season that
 production would be severely affected; the price of grain went up to seven times the
 previous postharvest price. Clearly the year ahead would be a time of subsistence living
 for many. It was during this early period of uncertainty that we conducted a cropping-
 systems survey of four villages about three hours walk south from Bireka, clustered
 around the market village and administrative center of Jaibat.26 The rains had been
 slightly better, and some households expected to collect small harvests.
 The survey respondents reported a fair amount of "musaada," or "help," extended
 during this period of uncertainty. Out of 98 male-headed households in the sample, 36
 had received cash or grain from kin, merchants, or persons from other villages. Out of
 17 female-headed households, 2 had also borrowed. Together they had taken only 48
 loans- 16 from kin, 32 from nonkin sources. Earlier in the season 4 households had also
 borrowed from the Agricultural Bank of Sudan.
 The amounts ofthe loans or help varied from LS 100 to LS 1,000 and from a few kilos
 to several hundred kilo sacks of grain. (During this period the price of a sack of grain
 varied from LS 1,200 to LS 1,800, and the official exchange rate had been devalued to
 LS 12 = US $ 1.) The 3 8 households that borrowed received the equivalent ofLS 42,690,
 or about LS 1,1 50 per household, when the grain loans were valued at prevailing market
 prices. A majority of the loans were taken by households whose heads worked as day
 laborers, but these tended to be smaller in size than the loans received by wealthier
 farmers. Fifteen households stated that they had to borrow in order to purchase the
 occasional government distributions of subsidized grain.
 The important fact about these loans was that virtually all were extended in the form
 of no-interest loans with no fixed period ofrepayment. In the sample of 1 5 households,
 only 2 indicated that their loans were interest bearing or that they expected to repay more
 then they had borrowed.
 A Sample of Laborers Confronting Crop Failure. When the seriousness of the
 drought became apparent, we conducted a survey of a quota sample of 60 household
 heads who worked as day laborers in six villages in the area around Bireka.27 We asked
 the laborers about four sources of actual or potential credit or assistance: migrants, kin
 and neighbors, immediate family living outside the village, and nonkin. The answers
 may be interpreted as giving an idea of the extent of emergency consumption credit or
 transfers intended primarily for subsistence. Only 6 households stated that they could
 rely on help or loans from returned migrants. There were 9 households that had
 unmarried sons who lived away from the village and who regularly sent cash to their
 families, usually on the order of LS 200-300 per month. Of 19 households that had
 married children living away from the village, only 3 indicated receiving any assistance
 from them. The most important source of assistance was explicit borrowing-24
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 households borrowed amounts ranging from LS 100 to LS 3,500. The total borrowed
 was LS 19,420, with the average loan being on the order ofLS 800, equivalent to perhaps
 one month's consumption of grain.
 Only three of the loans were interest-bearing: one from a merchant at 12 percent
 interest per month, another from the village development fund (known as sandug kheiri)
 that would be repaid at 15 percent per month if not repaid within a month, and the third
 from amerchant who wantedhalfofthe profits derived from the loan for trading capital.
 All of the other loans were at no interest.
 One of the interesting patterns in the borrowing of the relatively homogeneous
 laborers was the strong correlation between borrowing and wealth, measured in terms
 of livestock (mostly goats and for the laborers of one village, cows). As can be seen in
 table 5, where the laborers are broken down into four groups numbered 1 to 4, with the
 higher-numbered groups having larger livestock holdings, those laborers with larger
 livestock holdings both sold more livestock (because they had more to begin with) and
 borrowed more. The exception was group four, which consisted of laborers from one
 village whose residents specialized in cattle herding. These laborers owned two or three
 cows each and had relatively low borrowing.
 TABLE 5
 BORROWING MATCHED WITH LIVESTOCK HOLDrNGS
 AND SALES FOR SAMPLE OF 60 LABORERS
 Average Value of Average Value of Average
 Group Livestock Holdings Livestock Sales Borrowing
 1(N=20) 0 158 180
 2 (N = 20) 361 327 327
 3 (N= 1l) 1,453 869 1,098
 4(N = 12) 8,521 5,671 358
 The picture that emerges from considering all the preceding evidence is that credit
 markets are quite different from the monolithic sheil system described in the literature.
 In particular, sheil loans were found to be almost totally absent in Sheikan in 1990, and
 the few taken in 1989 seemed to be more idiosyncratic than institutional. The sheil loans
 taken in eastern Gezira in 1985 bore little resemblance to the exploitative system of the
 conventional wisdom. Two striking features were the widespread prevalence of no-
 interest loans and the relatively low volume of lending in Kordofan as compared with
 eastern Gezira or with the surveys just reviewed of farmers in the irrigated schemes.
 New Approaches to the Study of Informal Credit in Sudan
 This "revisionist" evidence and the ambiguities of previous research suggest that
 informal credit in Sudan is more complex than the simple picture of exploitative
 moneylending through sheil contracts. It is perhaps time to rethink what the objectives
 are in empirical work on informal credit in Sudan, and to think about how the research
 scope could be broadened so as to avoid focusing exclusively on interest rates. I would
 like to suggest three fruitful avenues for future research.
 Informality in Contract Form Rather Than Variation in Contract Forn. During the
 1980s there was considerable interest in understanding the complexity, interlinkages,
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 and variation in credit, land, and labor contracts. In particular, a large body of theory
 arose explaining why variation in credit contracts, in both competitive and monopolistic
 settings, is to be expected. Credit contracts may delimit maximum loan sizes, collateral
 requirements,28 interlinkages with transactions in other markets, provisions regarding
 enforcement, unforeseen contingencies, renegotiation,29 and monitoring, because loans
 to different people are ofdifferent quality, and different kinds ofcontract attract different
 kinds of loan applicants and have different incentive effects. These varied contract forms
 may be both screening mechanisms and enforcement mechanisms, to use the terminol-
 ogy of Stiglitz and Hoff.30 The lender may avoid the "adverse selection" of ending up
 with a mix ofborrowers weighted toward bad risks by offering a variety of contracts that
 induce the borrowers to "self-select." By carefully constructing contracts, lenders might
 be able to mitigate the losses resulting from lending to bad risks.
 Differences in borrowers may also be the basis for profitable price discrimination
 through variation in contract form. Borrowers are usually more risk averse than lenders
 and are often willing to pay a premium to avoid risk. In sheil loans that specify the number
 of sacks to be repaid, if prices turn out to be very low the borrower does not have to
 increase the number of sacks to be repaid. Under some circumstances, then, the sheil
 contract may be preferred to an interest rate contract; just as the Islamic profit-sharing
 loan may be preferable to a fixed-interest loan. Certain kinds of borrowers will prefer
 certain kinds of contracts.
 These theoretical results explaining variation in contract form are compelling, and the
 clean predictions about contract choice derived from the theory constitute an attractive
 research agenda. Nevertheless, research on these lines is inappropriate for many parts
 of Sudan. The striking feature about loans in eastern Gezira and western Sudan is the
 informality of the contract. There is usually no explicit statement of contract length,
 terms of repayment, or any of the other provisions previously mentioned. What this
 suggests is that there is nothing definite about contract form; no contract form has
 become institutionalized. The absence of an institution indicates a state of flux, and that
 flux is the proper object of study.31
 Let me illustrate this state of flux with an example from Bireka. A fairly well-off
 farmer and trader, Salih Adam, had borrowed from a merchant in the nearby market
 town. He had wanted money to finance the purchase of donkey saddles and bridles, his
 stock in trade. The agreement with the merchant was for Salih to pay a monthly interest
 rate of 15 percent. During the time I was in Bireka, however, Salih started studying to
 be afaqih, a Koranic teacher and charm maker. In conversations with the imam of the
 neighboring village, the subject of interest was raised. Salih decided, and the merchant
 apparently agreed, that the loan should be transformed into a profit-sharing arrangement.
 The demand for donkey riding gear decreased, however, as the drought reduced
 purchasing power. In several conversations with me, Salih insisted that he had not made
 any profits in his trade and so had not paid any money to the lender. At the time of my
 departure, Salih said he would not pay any of the loan back.
 While the loan transaction, its transformation from an interest to a profit-sharing
 arrangement, and subsequent nonrepayment are hardly representative of the variety of
 informal arrangements that were evident in Bireka, it does illustrate the point I want to
 make: there was nothing institutionalized about the transaction, and therefore it
 constituted one part of the process of the creation of institutions. The loan would be
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 discussed, argued over, perhaps disputed, and would thus become part of the public
 realm of discourse, shaping other lenders' and borrowers' attitudes and choices. The
 important thing to study, in my view, is the process by which contract forms are
 crystallizing and becoming predominant.
 Rationing in Credit Markets. One expects to find considerable agricultural credit in
 an economy with pronounced seasonality in crop production. Small farmers who have
 little accumulated wealth need to finance their consumption and occasional hired labor.
 Credit should smooth incomes dependent on variable weather and volatile prices. This
 indeed appears to be the case in eastern Gezira. It is somewhat surprising, then, to find
 so little informal credit in the village of Bireka in western Sudan.
 There are three possible explanations for this fact of limited borrowing. The first is
 that borrowing may be restricted because of imperfect information problems similar to
 those discussed earlier. If there were excess demand for loans, the terms of loans would
 not change, because with changes in terms the quality of borrowers might change, or the
 incentives for borrowers to repay might change.32 Then the return to the lender might be
 lower than before the change in repayment terms. Thus many borrowers would not be
 able to borrow as much as they wanted at the interest rates offered in the market, and
 many potential borrowers might be completely rationed.
 The second explanation is that the opportunity cost of risking funds in the local loan
 market is high because higher-level credit markets are characterized by high interest
 rates and rationing. Suppliers of credit may be rationed. Any empirical analysis must
 then address the national credit market and how financial capital is channeled to and from
 rural areas.
 The third explanation is simply that demand is very low; farmers do not choose to
 borrow given existing terms.
 How might these three possible explanations be distinguished? One way would be
 to look at how the participants themselves explained the low level of borrowing.
 Rhetoric about distrust, for instance, did serve as the most common explanation for the
 absence of loans. Potential lenders were believed not to trust anyone who would come
 to ask for a loan; requesting a loan is tantamount to an admission of inability or
 unwillingness to repay. The rhetoric is somewhat surprising in a village of neighbors
 who have known and transacted with each other over long periods of time. Surely not
 every farmer was to be distrusted? Local discourse also had it that merchants and rich
 people had no money to lend. Even a casual observer, however, would have difficulty
 defending this as a primary explanation ofthe low volume of credit. For instance, many
 poor families in the village of Um Showa, near Bireka, maintained that there was no
 money available for lending. Yet there were 16 current or returned migrants to Iraq,
 Libya, and the Gulf States in the 28 wealthier households ofthe village. The remittances
 and earnings of these migrants overwhelmed any potential income earned by the other
 villagers and could easily have been lent out. Finally, many people explained that there
 was no lending because in fact no one needed to borrow; the people of the area were
 relatively well-off, these informants said, and could rely on their own capital or work as
 wage laborers if they needed cash. Village rhetoric, then, encompassed all three
 explanations.
 A more satisfying approach would be to estimate a structural model of the informal
 credit market, deriving the parameters of the supply and demand function. Ideally one
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 would want to distinguish the different influences on supply and demand-opportunity
 costs, costs of potential defaults as expressed in distrust, and demand.
 Several recent papers have estimated structural models of this sort (concentraing on
 the interaction between formal and informal markets), and their methods should be used
 in future research on Sudanese credit markets. Bell, Snivasan, and Udry estimate the
 degree of rationing in Punjab agriculturl credit markets; they find that most borrowers
 are rationed in both the regulated cooperative sector and in the unregulated private
 sector.33 Kochar estimates the rationing of borrowers in Uttar Pradesh in India and
 reaches an opposite conclusion, arguing that low demand is responsible for the large
 number of sample respondents who did not borrow from the formal sector.34
 Political Patronage and Credit. Richards has drawn attention to the politics of
 patronage and indebtedness in Sierra Leone, and a similar approach to infornal credit
 in Sudan might yield considerable insight.35 One of the fundamental problems in
 analyzing credit trasactions in Sudan is the large number ofno-interest loans. How are
 these to be accounted for? One likely possibility is thatpolitical power is being purchased
 through extending credit. The village of Bireka, for instance, was mired in conflicts
 along ethnic and class lines. Three ethnic groups lived in the village. Hausa migrants
 from Nigeria constituted the majority, mixed Arab and indigenous groups (of Nuba
 origins) held overt political power, and a small group of Burgo households, originally
 from the Chad border area, maintained a vocal opposition. These groups also divided
 along class lines, and alliances shifted according to situations. One clear influence in
 political alignments, however, was the disproportionate wealth (compared with other
 villagers) of one Arab household head whose sons had migrated to Saudi Arabia. Many
 poor villagers would cite his wealth, and his potential to refuse assistance in times of
 need, as a factor in their decisions about political alignment on the periodic questions that
 would divide the villagers. Village politics were muted during 1990, the period when I
 was doing fieldwork, because of the uncertainty over ideology and practice emanating
 from Khartoum. It was certain, however, that the wealthy Arab household would use its
 economic influence to extend its political influence to an even greater degree when the
 political environment became more settled.
 Concluding Comments
 In this paper I have suggested, to return to my initial metaphor, that the sheil is a shill,
 in the sense that many academic writers have drawn large and sometimes inappropriate
 generalizations from an unclear and selective body of evidence in order to characterize
 rural Sudanese economic relations. The evidence presented here indicates that rural
 credit markets are far more complex and varied than the shills would have one believe.
 This observation is important for policy, suggesting that the urgency with which rural
 credit is advocated (because small farmers are being "ruthessly exploited') leads to
 hurried, expensive, overextended, and ultimately ill-conceived credit programs that
 amount to little more than one-time subsidies to selectgroups offarmers-those who are
 most able to take advantage of the subsidies as a result of wealth or political connec-
 tions.36 The implication of this paper's criticism ofthe conventional wisdom about sheil
 is that credit programs should be small-scale and locally designed, and should emphasize
 local participation in determining the institutional features of formal lending. Such an
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 approach is labor intensive, to be sure, but unless steps are taken in that direction,
 development banks and donor agencies are sure to continue to "undermine rural
 development with cheap credit."37
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